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Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion 
1. Introduction 
It has become popular to conceive of emotions as epistemically valuable. According to a 
widely held view, emotions provide epistemic access to the normative significance of objects 
and events in our surroundings.1 Roughly, the proposal is that, in favourable circumstances, 
feeling fear or contempt towards x conveys that x has a certain negative import, while feeling 
admiration or pride towards x conveys that x is positively significant in some respect. I will 
refer to this view of emotion as the Epistemic View. 
 The Epistemic View is taken to articulate a strong pre-theoretical intuition. In 
particular, many of its proponents suppose that ordinary emotional experience is aptly 
characterized in terms of the apprehension of specific normative properties.2 Moreover, the 
view holds theoretical appeal for those interested in developing a non-mysterious, quasi-
empiricist epistemology of the normative. If the view is correct, there is no need to posit a 
special faculty of intuition to explain how it is possible to detect normative properties. Rather, 
this role is fulfilled by a familiar and non-mysterious class of psychological phenomena. If we 
are careful to avoid certain traditional rationalist prejudices, emotions can be recognized as 
providing access to normative properties much like sensory perceptions detect sensory 
properties.3 
My concern in this paper is with one particularly prominent version of the Epistemic 
View. On this version, the normative properties to which emotions allegedly provide access 
are response-dependent. Proponents of this version claim that the fearsome (contemptible) 
character of something or someone is detected in episodes of fear (contempt), while 
admirability (prideworthiness) is registered in experiences of admiration (pride). As suggested 
by the terms we use to pick out these properties, they are essentially related to a particular 
emotion. Thus, it is essential to something’s being fearsome (contemptible) that it stands in a 
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specific relation to fear (contempt). Because of their essential connection to emotions, I shall 
refer to these properties as affective properties. To distinguish the claim that emotions provide 
epistemic access to affective properties from other variants of the Epistemic View on which 
they register response-independent values, I shall refer to the former as the Response-
Dependence View. 
While defended across the analytic-continental divide, the earliest appearances of the 
Response-Dependence View can be traced to main figureheads of the late phenomenological 
tradition. In particular, it has been argued to be a core aspect of Heidegger’s views on 
affectivity that emotions reveal corresponding response-dependent properties.4 Though 
perhaps more controversial, Sartre’s claims about the intentionality of emotion invite a similar 
interpretation.5 In contemporary analytic philosophy, the grounds for the view have famously 
been prepared by McDowell, who puts forward the idea of value experiences which are 
relevantly similar to sensory experiences of secondary qualities.6 McDowell considers 
emotions like fear and admiration to be candidates for value experiences, thus pointing 
towards a view on which emotions provide epistemic access to corresponding response-
dependent properties (fearsomeness, admirability). On this proposal, emotional experience 
constitutes a sensitivity to the way things evaluatively are which importantly complements 
our sense-perceptual access to colour. 7 
In this paper, I put some pressure on the Response-Dependence View. My charge will 
focus on the nature of the essential link between affective properties and the corresponding 
emotional responses. I will argue that the Response-Dependence View is at odds with the 
most common, normative conception of this connection.8 I begin a few additional clarificatory 
remarks on this view and its motivation (section 2). Then I go on to specify the normative 
character of affective properties (section 3) and show how it conflicts with the Response-
Dependence View (section 4). 
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I should note that the argument I provide in this paper is negative. I argue that a 
popular account of the epistemic significance of emotion is unsuccessful. In doing so, I do not 
mean to cast doubt on the very concern to develop an epistemology of affective properties, 
but only to rule out one option that has come to seem attractive to many. While I do not go on 
to construct an alternative picture, I nonetheless hope to lay some foundations for the 
development of more adequate view of our epistemic access to them by highlighting the 
normative character of affective properties and the difficulty it raises for the Response-
Dependency view. 
 
2. The Response-Dependence View 
Affective properties seem to be quite plausible candidates for properties that are epistemically 
accessible through emotion. If there is an experience that is apt to convey the fearsomeness of 
some object, it seems prima facie compelling to suppose that it is fear. A helpful way to make 
sense of the plausibility of this claim is by relating it to a specific conception of the link 
between colour and sensory experience. It is very common to suppose that colours are 
response-dependent and as such essentially tied to sensory experiences of them. In conceiving 
of redness as a secondary quality we take it as essential to something’s being red that it stands 
in a specific relation to the corresponding colour impression. At the same time, colour 
impressions also plausibly constitute our primary epistemic access to colour. In light of this, it 
is tempting to model the connection between emotions and affective properties along similar 
lines. If affective properties, too, are response-dependent, it is not far-fetched to suppose that 
episodes of fear are apt to detect fearsomeness just as impressions of red and blue detect 
redness and blueness, respectively.9 
While proponents of the Response-Dependence View characteristically model 
emotional access to response-dependent properties directly on sensory access to colour, my 
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understanding of the view will be slightly more liberal. As stated above, the view claims that 
emotions convey to their subjects exemplifications of affective properties. I will take it that 
the exemplification of a property may be conveyed to an individual by being presented to her 
by some mental state of hers, where ‘present’ refers to the specific, direct manner in which 
material objects and their sensory properties are detected in sensory perception. I shall not 
suppose, however, that exemplifications of properties can be conveyed only in this 
presentational manner. I do not wish to rule out that this can be achieved also by mental 
events or states that represent property exemplifications without presenting them.10 This 
construal of the Response-Dependence View accommodates for variants of the view which do 
not assume that emotions involve some kind of quasi-perceptual impression or appearance.11  
Proponents of such variants still suppose that there is an important epistemic analogy with the 
perceptual detection of sensory properties, though. That is, as I understand the Response-
Dependence View, all of its versions are committed to an analogy with the perception of 
secondary qualities in that emotions are seen as affording our primary epistemic access to 
affective properties. I take it that this epistemic analogy is crucial to the appeal of the view as 
a candidate for a quasi-empiricist epistemology of normative properties. 
To conceive of emotions as our primary access to affective properties is to suppose 
that we normally depend on the former for our awareness of the latter. Just as we standardly 
rely on sensory impressions of red to detect redness, we standardly rely on experiences of fear 
to detect fearsomeness. This is, of course, compatible with the existence of other types of 
access to them. We may be told that some event or situation is fearsome just as we may be 
told the colour of some object without enjoying the corresponding emotional or visual 
experience ourselves. Proponents of the Response-Dependence View ought to allow that, in 
favourable circumstances, testimony, too, can afford epistemic access to affective properties. 
Yet, in maintaining the epistemic analogy with perception of sensory properties, they are 
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committed to a different view of how normally detect them. On the Response-Dependence 
View, we more routinely become aware of affective properties through the corresponding 
emotion. 
With these clarificatory remarks in place, I now turn to the normative character of 
affective properties and how it conflicts with this view. 
 
3. The Practical Import of Affective Properties 
In thinking of colours as response-dependent properties, we conceive of them as dispositions 
to produce corresponding colour impressions. By contrast, the response-dependence of 
affective properties is not normally cashed out in mere dispositional terms. Instead of 
supposing that affective properties are dispositions to produce certain emotions, it is much 
more common to think of their essential link to emotions as deontic. More specifically, on the 
standard, deontic view of affective properties, x is fearsome (contemptible, admirable…) if 
and only if x requires, merits or gives reason for being feared (despised, admired…). As this 
explication suggests, the term ‘deontic’ is here to be understood in a broad sense which covers 
forms of prescriptive import that fall short of genuine obligations or oughts. If for x to be 
fearsome is for x to give reason for being feared, it does not follow that one ought to be afraid 
of x. Perhaps there are better reasons not to be. It still seems plausible to conceive of 
fearsomeness as having prescriptive force on this view. This is because, if x gives one reason 
to fear x, one is doing something wrong not to fear x unless there is adequate countervailing 
justification. The property has prescriptive force insofar as there is a need for adequate 
justification to do other than what it gives one reason to do. 
The deontic view of affective properties is most prominently exemplified by neo-
sentimentalism. Neo-sentimentalists conceive of affective properties as axiological properties 
whose normativity is to be reductively analysed in deontic terms.12 It is worth stressing, 
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though, that the deontic view of them is not specific to neo-sentimentalism. Various theorists 
conceive of affective properties as deontic from the outset, proposing that they are deontic as 
opposed to or over and above being axiological.13 In contrast to the former, these latter views 
assume a deontic conception of them independently of any aspiration to reduce the 
axiological to the deontic.14 
 If we assume (as I will) the standard, deontic view of affective properties, this has 
important consequences for our understanding of their role in our emotional lives. That is, we 
thereby recognize affective properties as practically significant vis à vis the corresponding 
emotion. This practical significance is captured in part by the idea that they prescribe a certain 
emotion. But there is a further aspect to it. It is a familiar and natural thought that deontic 
entities – entities which give directions on how to conduct – must be such that they can make 
a difference to our actual conduct by providing guidance on how to act (feel, think). That is to 
say that it must in general be possible to heed their directions in order to bring ourselves to do 
what they solicit: we must be able to come to act (feel, think) as solicited by deontic entities 
on account of their solicitations. Intuitively, if deontic entities did not allow for this 
possibility, this would seem to undermine their very point or purpose.   
I will refer to this requirement on deontic entities as the Guidance Constraint. Applied 
to the case of affective properties, it requires that they guide the formation of the 
corresponding emotional attitude: if the property of being fearsome has prescriptive force, 
then it must in general be possible for us to come to feel fear towards fearsome things on 
account of their fearsomeness. The Guidance Constraint thus specifies an additional respect in 
which affective properties are practically significant. As prescriptions they must be able to 
make an actual difference to our emotional lives. 
 Though perhaps not beyond dispute, the Guidance Constraint is very widely accepted. 
For the purpose of this paper, I will assume it is true. Given this assumption, I take it to be a 
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natural requirement on an adequate epistemology of the deontic that it is sensitive to this 
constraint. That is, an adequate account of our epistemic access to deontic entities should 
allow for them to guide our conduct. Yet it seems that the Response-Dependence View fails 
on this count. Let me explain. 
 
4. The Response-Dependence View and the Practical Import of Affective Properties 
According to the Response-Dependence View, our primary access to affective properties is 
provided by the very emotion they prescribe. Its proponents hold that the fearsome 
(admirable) character of things is typically registered in episodes of fear (admiration). This 
means that the Guidance Constraint is systematically violated. It seems that no guidance can 
be had from a prescription that one comes to be aware of by doing what it prescribes. If x 
prescribes fear of x, and this prescription is detected precisely by fearing x, then any guidance 
one might expect to receive from this prescription on what to feel towards x comes too late.15 
It seems uncontroversial that for prescriptions to provide any guidance they have to be within 
our ken. It is impossible for us to comply with a prescription that has not registered with us. 
Yet if the prescription to fear x is brought within our ken by the very feeling whose formation 
it is supposed to guide, then it can no longer guide its formation. In order to come to feel as 
prescribed by an affective property on account of that property, some prior grasp of it is 
needed. 
 To get a clearer grasp of the problem, consider a structurally analogous scenario. 
Imagine a cardboard box with a flap at the top. There is an instruction on the flap, which says 
“Please tear open”, but it is written on its back. Thus, to read the instruction you must tear 
open the flap. In this case, for you to know what you are supposed to do you must already do 
that exact thing. But this means that the instruction on the flap can no longer provide any 
guidance. For you to tear the flap open on account of the instruction, you must be aware of 
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this instruction before tearing it open. As long as your access to it is provided by the action 
prescribed, the instruction is practically otiose. 
 Of course, this analogy is not perfect. This scenario concerns a specific action rather 
than emotion. Moreover, while the Response-Dependence View concerns a well-known class 
of deontic properties, it is not clear that there is any familiar deontic property corresponding 
to the instruction to tear open the flap. However, what matters for my purposes is the 
structural similarity between the detection of affective properties, as conceived by adherents 
of the Response-Dependence View, and the detection of the instruction. In both cases, our 
access to what is demanded of us inherently precludes the demand from making any 
difference to our conduct. If we access the prescription via the very conduct prescribed, it can 
no longer help us conform our conduct accordingly. Since this what the Guidance Constraint 
requires of affective properties, it conflicts with the claim that we gain awareness of them 
through the corresponding emotion.  
 Faced with this charge, proponents of the Response-Dependence View might insist 
that they are not committed to emotions providing our sole access to affective properties. 
They might maintain that it is possible to come to know affective properties by other means, 
and only subsequently feel the corresponding emotion. Thus, it is possible to learn that some 
object is fearsome via testimony and, as a result of this, be afraid of it. In this case, access to 
the prescription to fear that object is available prior to feeling afraid so that the prescription 
can guide us in forming the emotion.  
However, acknowledging this possibility helps little to alleviate the charge. After all, 
proponents of the Response-Dependence View are committed to emotions providing our 
primary access to affective properties and thus suppose that we standardly depend on our 
emotions for our awareness of them. If most exemplifications of affective properties in our 
surroundings are detected emotionally rather than by emotion-independent means, there will 
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be comparatively few of them whose directions we can heed. True, on the picture proposed by 
the Response-Dependence View, exemplifications of these properties can guide us in forming 
the corresponding emotion on those occasions when we come to be aware of them by 
emotion-independent means. But these will be the exception rather than the rule. If it were 
true that we normally rely on our emotions to detect affective properties, then, for the most 
part, they would be precluded from offering guidance since our access to them would be 
provided by the very attitude prescribed. Yet according to the Guidance Constraint, affective 
properties should generally be able to make a difference to how we feel, not only in rare 
cases. It seems that the Response-Dependence View cannot accommodate for this. 
Perhaps adherents of the view will instead attempt to rebut the charge by questioning 
that affective properties cannot afford any guidance when emotionally detected. More 
specifically, they might concede that affective properties registered by means of the 
corresponding emotion fail to guide its formation but insist that it does not follow that no 
guidance is available in such cases at all. As they might propose, when we emotionally detect 
an affective property, we are solicited to preserve our emotion.16 The idea would be that the 
directions given by affective properties are contingent upon our present mental state. That is, 
their deontic character should be analysed in terms of a conditional prescription, which tells 
us to feel the corresponding emotion, if we do not already feel it, and to preserve feeling it, if 
we do. On this picture, we can bring our conduct in conformity with the prescriptions of 
affective properties that we register emotionally by continuing to feel as we do. 
Unfortunately, though, this response is a non-starter. The prescriptions associated with 
affective properties do not have this complex conditional structure. The demands imposed by 
the fearsome or admirable are unconditional and do not concern what to feel in the future. 
Assuming that proponents of the Response-Dependence View wish to remain faithful to the 
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actual deontic character of affective properties, the problem I raised thus remains untouched 
by this response. 
What has been said so far suggests that adherents of the Response-Dependence View 
face a serious difficulty in that they are unable to respect the Guidance Constraint. While this 
constitutes my main charge against the view, it seems worth adding some observations that 
help bring out more clearly its peculiar conception of the epistemic contribution of emotion. 
On this conception, subjects of emotion find themselves in a rather strange normative 
situation. The Response-Dependence View implies that emotions convey to us prescriptions 
which we already conform with the very instant we apprehend them. It thus leaves us in the 
undignified position of being systematically confronted with normative pressure that seem 
misplaced: the deliverances of emotions systematically call upon us to do what we are at that 
very moment already doing. This pressure is inappropriate precisely because prescriptions are 
supposed to afford guidance. There is no room left to adjust our conduct so as to conform 
with what is emotionally conveyed. 
To further illuminate this odd consequence of the view, it is helpful to return to the 
above analogy. As the cardboard box is constructed, you come to be aware of the instruction 
to tear open the flap by tearing it open. At the time you are reading it, the instruction is thus 
inappropriate: you are asked to tear open the flap when this is what you are already doing. 
Since this instruction is supposed to afford guidance but there is no room to adjust your 
conduct accordingly, it seems misplaced. The Response-Dependence View represents the 
deliverances of emotions as unfitting in this exact same sense: practically speaking, what is 
emotionally conveyed makes no sense. 
These remarks further expose the strange disconnect between the epistemic role which 
adherents of the view accord to emotions and the practical significance of affective properties. 
To be fair, supporters of the Response-Dependence View may want to dispute that this 
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consequence causes much additional trouble for them. Perhaps the mismatch between what is 
emotionally conveyed and our actual conduct will not be deemed worrisome over and above 
reflecting the already exposed tension between their view and the Guidance Constraint. 
However, making explicit how the view conceives of the epistemic yield of emotion does 
have some dialectical import not least because it casts doubt on the view’s larger motivation. 
Theorists espousing this or other versions of the Epistemic View are usually concerned to 
show that emotions make an epistemic contribution that is important or valuable. If the 
supposed contribution is ultimately a matter of conveying misplaced demands, this somewhat 
hampers their ambition. What emotions tell us on the Response-Dependence View is at best 
confusing. If the view were true, we would do much better to ignore them. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Many theorists hold that our primary epistemic access to affective properties is provided by 
the corresponding emotion. I have argued that this view is incompatible with a widely held 
meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More 
specifically, I have argued that proponents of this view cannot accommodate for the 
requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the 
formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary access to them cannot be provided by 
that same emotion. This is because this emotional access leaves no room to adjust our conduct 
so as to conform to what they prescribe. A more adequate epistemology of affective 
properties must allow for our primary access to them to be available to us prior to feeling the 
prescribed emotion. It is only if this access is available in advance of feeling this emotion that 
affective properties can guide its formation. 
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